It seems that for practical purposes experience is not inferior to art; indeed we see men of experience succeeding more than those who have theory without experience. This is because experience is about particulars, and art is about universals, but actions and events are all concerned with particulars (. . . ). Hence, if a physician has theory (logos) without experience, and knows the universal, but ignores the particular falling under it (to d' en toutôi kath'hekston), he will often get the therapy wrong; because what is to be treated is above all the particular. (a-) In the Nicomachean Ethics he repeats that "praxis has to do with particulars" (hê de praxis peri ta kath'hekasta, b), and that in practical matters to have mere empeiria is better than to know only the universal: This is also why from time to time, in other matters as well, people who lack universal knowledge, i.e. men of experience, are more effective than others who have it. For instance if a man knows that light meat is easily digested and wholesome, but does not know what kinds of meat are light, he will not produce health; whereas a man who merely knows that chicken meat is light and healthy will be more effective. (b-) But the conclusion he draws from this distinction is that practical wisdom should possess both the universal and the particular facts: practical wisdom is not only about universals, it is necessary to know the particulars as well, since it is concerned with action and action has to do with particulars (. . . ) practical wisdom has to do with action, so one must know both, or above all particular facts. (b- + -; my emphasis).
Gadamer has described the lasting importance of Aristotle's conception of phronêsis starting from this element. According to him, whereas in Plato ethics is about applying a rule to a given case, doing the same as a technician who applies the universal rules of his art, e.g. architecture, to the production of an individual object, Aristotle's conception of practical wisdom gives much more importance to particulars: there should be a dialogue between universal and particular, and acting is a matter of interpretation, not of applying an universal rule to a given case (Gadamer , -).
Whatever the merits of Gadamer's interpretation of practical wisdom, one shortcoming of his position is to identify phronêsis and practical philosophy. He thinks that the condition of validity of practical reasoning described in the NE apply to the NE itself. Aristotle's ethics is practical reasoning, according to him, and not a dry and general reflection about universal moral concepts.
I cannot completely agree on this point. Aristotle knows very well the difference between acting in practice and theorizing about virtuous action, and discusses this problem in a passage in NE II:
Since the present study, unlike others, is not about mere theory, for we are not investigating what virtue is in order to know it, but in order to become good, for the reason that otherwise our enquiry will be of no use, it is necessary to enquire about things connected with action, and how to act; as we already said before, actions determine also the quality of our habits (. . . ) Let us agree on the fact that it is better if the entire discourse
